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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1976, a young John Hinckley, Jr. watched Travis
Bickle plot to assassinate a presidential candidate in the cult film Taxi
Driver., Hinckley fell in love with actress Jodie Foster, who portrayed
*Editor'sNote: This Note received the GertrudeBrick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the
best student note submitted in the Spring 1988 semester.
**Author's Note: The author thanks Professor Toni M. Massaro for providing the topic and
much guidance.
1.

Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547

(1985).
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a twelve year old prostitute in the film. 2 Hinckley's obsession with
both Foster and the President culminated on March 30, 1981, when
Hinckley shot and wounded President Reagan in a desperate attempt
3
to impress Foster.
Several defense psychiatrists testified at trial. Since Hinckley suffered from "process schizophrenia," they concluded he was insane when
he shot the President. 4 Despite contradictory testimony by government
psychiatrists, the jury found Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity.6 In the wake of the ensuing public outcry against the insanity
defense, 7 Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.8
The Act severely limited the availability and effectiveness of the insanity defense.9
This note calls for the repeal of the portion of the Act that established Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). 10 Rule 704(b) prohibits expert
witnesses from stating "ultimate" conclusions on the mental health of
criminal defendants.", As a limitation on the testimony of mental health
experts, Rule 704(b) prejudices criminal defendants and creates confusion in federal courts. Rule 704(b) resurrects the defunct ultimate
2
issue rule, long recognized as unsound by courts and legal scholars.1
Thus, Rule 704(b) restricts testimony crucial to an insanity defense,
and should be repealed.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 1547-48.
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1545.
Id.
See N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at Al, col. 6.

7. Salet, supra note 1, at 1553 n.28 (according to an ABC news poll, 83% of the nation
considered Hinckdey's acquittal unjust).
8.

Title IV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2067 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20) (hereinafter

Act].
9. The Act accomplished three major reforms. It established a new test for insanity, limited
expert testimony through Rule 704(b), and shifted the burden of proving insanity to the defense.
The Act reads:

Insanity defense
(a) Affirmative Defense. - It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any
Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the
offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable
to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease
or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of Proof. - The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of
insanity by clear and convincing evidence.

Id.
10.
11.
12.

Act, supra note 8.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b). See infra note 35.
See infra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
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This note will first outline the history of the ultimate issue rule.
This outline includes the rationale that inspired the rule, and the

criticism that led to its abolition. This note will then discuss Rule
704(b)'s resurrection of the ultimate issue rule. Next, this note will
interpret the original intent of Rule 704(b) through its text and legislative history. Then, this note will describe the conflicting applications
of Rule 704(b) in federal courts. Finally, this note will identify four
legitimate dangers inherent in ultimate issue psychiatric testimony,
and propose an approach that addresses the dangers more effectively
than Rule 704(b).
II. THE ULTIMATE ISSUE RULE
In 1840, the Vermont Supreme Court in Davis v. Fuller excluded
testimony regarding the cause of backwater in a river. 1 The court

reasoned that causation was an issue for the jury alone to decide. As
such, witnesses may not replace the jury by giving opinions "on the
point on trial."'1 4 Vermont thus became the first state to implement
6
the ultimate issue rule.r Soon thereafter, numerous American courts
barred witnesses from expressing opinions on ultimate issues, reason7
ing that such opinions "invade the province of the jury.'
By the turn of the century, courts began to question the validity

of the ultimate issue rule. s In the 1930's and 1940's, criticism of the
rule intensified, and numerous courts allowed opinion testimony on
the issue before the jury. 9 In 1942, the Iowa Supreme Court embarked

13. See Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends, and a Note of Caution, 41
CENTER J. 226 (1964) (citing 12 Vt. 178 (1840)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 226-27 & nn.6-9 ("after 1874, the rule is frequently encountered").
17. Id. at 226. Such testimony was said to either "usurp the function of the jury," or "invade
the province of the jury." See, e.g., United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935) (excluding
an expert opinion as to whether the insured was permanently disabled before the lapse of the
insurance policy).
18. See, e.g., Eastern Transp. Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 477, 478 (1877) ("[it is not an objection
.. . that [the witness] was asked a question involving the point to be decided by the jury");
Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Berberich, 94 F. 329 (8th Cir. 1899) (court allowed expert to
testify that a coal mine was in safe condition).
19. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (psychiatristis could
testify that defendant was able to tell right from wrong at the time of the offense); Mutual
Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Francis, 148 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1945) (experts, as opposed
to lay witnesses, may express opinions on ultimate issues); Svenson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
87 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1937) (doctors performing autopsy could testify that deceased's wounds
were not self-inflicted); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Doerksen, 64 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1933)
(medical expert may give opinion as to cause of death).
DEN. L.
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on a detailed analysis of the rule. 2° In Grismore v. ConsolidatedProducts Co.,21 the court concluded that the jury's prerogative to accept

or reject testimony preserves the jury's role as final arbiter, even in
the face of ultimate issue testimony.2 Grismore began a widespread
m By 1964, many legal scholars
trend towards abandoning the rule.2
had declared the rule theoretically unsound,? and most jurisdictions
had abandoned or severely modified the rule.25 In 1975, Congress
seemed to lay the ultimate issue rule to rest by enacting Federal Rule
of Evidence 704.0- Rule 704 codified the nearly unanimous proposition
that otherwise admissible opinion testimony may embrace ultimate
issues.?
Although Rule 704 imposed no restriction on expert testimony,
other evidentiary rules limited its admissibility.? Federal Rules of
Evidence 70129 and 70230 mandate that opinion testimony assist the

trier of fact. Further, Rule 403 requires exclusion of evidence if its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 31 Thus,
20.
21.
22.

Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
Id.
Id. at 344-47, 5 N.W.2d at 656.
Stoebuck, supra note 13, at 238 (refers to Grismore as a "pathfinder case").

See, e.g.,
23.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (psychiatrist could testify that defendant
was of unsound mind at the time of the crime); Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515,
260 P.2d 549 (1953) (expert could testify as to cause of truck accident).
24. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 12 (2d ed. 1972); J. WIGMORE, 7 EVIDENCE §§ 1920-21
(3d ed. 1940) (Wigmore labeled the rule "empty rhetoric"). See also Stoebuck, supra note 13,
at 226.
25. Stoebuck, supra note 13, at 236.
26. As originally enacted, Fed. R. Evid. 704 read: "Testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact." Id.
27. Many states have adopted provisions similar to Rule 704. See, e.g., CALIF. EVID. CODE
§ 805 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20, § 5-2-5 (1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 9, § 120
(1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2704 (1986).
28. The Advisory Committee Note warns that Rule 704 does not admit all opinions. This
warning refers to the limitations imposed on Rule 704 by Rules 403, 701 & 702. FED. R. EVID.
704 Advisory Committee Note.
29. FED. R. EVID. 701 provides that non-expert opinion testimony is admissible only if
"helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue." Id.
30. FED. R. EID. 702 reads: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
31. FED. R. EVID. 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Id.
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545

even after Rule 704 abolished the ultimate issue rule, courts continued
excluding ultimate issue testimony when witnesses offered prejudicial
or unhelpful legal conclusions.2 In Hinckley and other similar cases,
however, criminal courts granted expert witnesses unbridled discretion to state conclusions as to the defendant's sanity.3

III.

THE HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 704(b)

A.

The Enactment of Rule 704(b)

In 1984, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act.-4 The
Act added section (b) to Rule 704, 5 limited the existing definition of

32. See, e.g., Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985) (witness could not
testify that plaintiff had been "discriminated" against); Owen v. Kerr McGee Corp., 698 F.2d
236 (5th Cir. 1983) (expert could not testify as to the legal "cause" of a car accident); United
States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1978) (FBI agent could testify that defendant was a
bookmaker, but not that defendant was "guilty"). See generally United States v. Scavo, 593
F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979) (legal conclusions are still inadmissible after Rule 704); United States
v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977) (court reasoned that, "Rule 704 abolishes the per
se rule against testimony regarding ultimate issues of fact... however, courts must remain
vigilant against admissions of legal conclusions").
33. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir. 1982) (experts could
testify as to whether defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct); United
States v. Sullivan, 595 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1979) (expert could testify that defendant was insane);
United States v. Hall, 583 F.2d 1288, 1293 (5th Cir. 1978) (expert could testify that defendant
"lacked substantial mental capacity to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law").
See generally United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[p]sychiatrists and
psychologists ... may testify broadly as to their contacts with a defendant who relies on an
insanity defense, and state their conclusions as to his condition, in medical as well as legal
terms'). These cases reflect the current law of Florida. FLA. STAT. § 90.703 (1987) abolished
the ultimate issue rule, but Florida has not adopted Rule 704(b). The only limitations on expert
testimony in Florida are FLA. STAT. §§ 90.702 & 90.403 (1987) which mirror Federal Rules 702
and 403, respectively. See Lenahan v. Lenahan, 511 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987).
Florida's insanity defense is very similar to the current federal test:
If at the time of an alleged crime a defendant was by reason of mental infirmity,
disease or defect unable to understand the nature and quality of his act or its
consequences or, if he did understand it, was incapable of distinguishing that which
is right from that which is wrong, he was legally insane.
Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977). It has long been established in Florida that an
expert may express an opinion as to the sanity or insanity of a criminal defendant. See, e.g.,
Hellman v. State, 492 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986); Blocker v. State, 87 Fla. 128, 110
So. 547 (1926).
34. See Act, supra note 8.
35. FED. R. EVID. 704 now reads:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
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insanity, 36 and shifted the burden of proving insanity to the criminal

defendant. 37 Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert witness from stating an
opinion as to whether the defendant possessed the mental state constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense to the crime.8
The rule reserves such "ultimate issues" for the trier of fact.3 9
The legislative history behind Rule 704(b) expressed an intent to
limit expert mental health testimony because such testimony was often
unreliable and confused juries.40 The legislative history cited to the

American Psychiatric Association (APA) Statement on the Insanity
Defense. 41 In this statement, the APA expressed the psychiatric profession's concern that mental health experts often testified as to matters beyond, their expertise.4 Acknowledging this concern, the rule
limits psychiatric expert testimony to medical diagnoses. For the purposes of Rule 704(b), medical diagnoses include determining whether
the defendant suffers from a severe mental disease, and, if so, exploring the characteristics of the disease.4

(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone.
Id.
36. American courts first adopted the English test of insanity established in the M'Naughten
case, which excused criminal defendants who were unaware of their acts or that such acts were
wrong. In 1897, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373
(1897), added a volitional prong to the test, whereby one who acted under an "irresistable
impulse" resulting from mental disease was not held responsible for criminal actions. In 1954,
the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to simplify the test, excusing in Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), unlawful acts which were the product of mental disease
or defect. In 1972, United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), overruled Durham
and adopted a two pronged test formulated by the American Law Institute (ALI) MODEL
PENAL CODE, which excused defendants who lack "substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality" of their conduct or to conform to the law. See generally United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). The current test eliminates the volitional prong of the ALI test. See
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3405-06.
37. See supranote 9. Previously, if a defendant raised the issue of insanity, the government
then had the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. S. REP. No.
225, supra note 36, at 3406.
38. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
39. Id.
40. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 3404-05.
41. Id. at 3412 n.33.
42. Id. at 3413.
43. Id. at 3412.
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While the legislative history of the rule focused on the inadequacy
of expert psychiatric testimony, the plain language of amended Rule
704 indicates that reliable testimony may be excluded merely because
it reaches the ultimate issue. The original Rule 704 provided that
"otherwise admissible" opinion testimony will not be excluded merely
because it embraces an ultimate issue.M In amending the rule, Congress designated this original rule as Rule 704(a), and qualified it with
the preface, "except as provided in subdivision (b). ' '45 By identifying
Rule 704(b) as an exception to Rule 704(a), the language of the entire
rule implies that 704(b) excludes otherwise admissible opinion testimony because it embraces an ultimate issue. The legislative history
indicated that the rule excludes confusing testimony outside of the
expert's area of expertise. 46 However, for testimony excluded by Rule
704(b) to be "otherwise admissible," it must be relevant, 47 probative,4
49
and helpful to the jury.
The last sentence of Rule 704(b) states that the issue of the defendant's mental state is an "ultimate issue . . . for the trier of fact
alone." 5 This sentence suggests that Rule 704(b) is a limited application
of the ultimate issue rule abolished by the original Rule 704.r' Thus,
the plain meaning of Rule 704(b) departs from the well-established
rule that an expert may state an opinion on any issue, if the opinion
assists the trier of fact.2
B.

The Application of Rule 704(b)

Since Congress enacted Rule 704(b), federal courts have struggled
to coherently apply the rule. Some courts have adopted the apparent
legislative intent, while others have followed the language of the rule. 3
Several courts have applied the rule in a manner that is consistent
with neither the language nor the intent of the rule. 4

44. See supra note 26.
45. See supra note 35.
46. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
47. FED. R. Evm. 402 provides that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Id.
48. FED. R. EVID. 403; see supra note 31.
49. FED. R. EVID. 702; see supra note 30.
50. See supra note 35.
51. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1971) (an expert may give
an opinion on an ultimate issue if the opinion aids the jury in understanding the evidence). See
generally DiBella v. County of Suffolk, 574 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (after Rule 704, Rule
702 may still exclude mixed questions of law and fact).
53. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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Two distinct approaches have thus evolved. Courts focusing on

legislative intent have excluded testimony phrased in terms of applicable legal standards because such legal terms are beyond the expertise
of psychiatric experts.5 Yet, due to the Rule's reference to ultimate
issues, courts focusing on the language of the Rule have excluded

testimony reaching ultimate issues regardless of legal terminology.5
As a result of the inconsistent applications of Rule 704(b), it is difficult
to predict whether a given court will admit or exclude expert psychiatric testimony regarding the mental state of a criminal defendant. 57
1. Some Courts Exclude Testimony Phrased in Legal or Statutory Language
Most federal courts have interpreted Rule 704(b) as prohibiting
expert testimony that employs conclusory legal terminology or that

55. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
57. Courts have consistently held that Rule 704(b) is constitutional. In 1986, Rule 704(b)
withstood a constitutional challenge when the Eleventh Circuit held that the Rule does not
violate the fifth amendment. See United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986). In
Freeman, the defendant was convicted of robbery despite his claim of insanity. Id. at 1575. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony under 704(b)
violated his fifth amendment right to prepare a defense. Id. at 1576. The court held that the
Rule does not prohibit the defendant from introducing evidence helpful to the jury, but "merely
reserves for the jury the authority to determine the insanity of the accused under the statutory
standards." Id.
In support of the constitutionality of the Rule, the Freemancourt noted that the Rule applies
equally to testimony offered by the prosecution. However, the fact that the exclusion applies
to the government as well as to the defendant does not justify the rule. The government no
longer has the burden of producing any evidence of a defendant's sanity, and enjoys greater
resources than criminal defendants. Equal elimination of the tools of both parties magnifies the
government's inherent advantage.
Other circuits using similar language later held that the rule does not violate the sixth
amendment right to a fair trial. See United States v. Williams, No. 86-5750, 822 F.2d 60 (6th
Cir. 1987) (unpublished disposition available on WESTLAW, CTA 6 database). The rule also does
not violate the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process. See United States v. Alexander,
805 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986).
On other constitutional challenges, several federal courts have held that retroactive application of the rule is constitutionally permissible. Convicted of first degree murder, the defendant
in United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1986) contended that retroactive application
of the rule violated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Id. at 1070 (defendant committed
the crime on August 31, 1984; Rule 704(b) was enacted on October 12, 1984). The Fourth Circuit
interpreted the Rule as merely changing "the style of question and answer" allowable in eliciting
expert psychiatric testimony. Id. at 1071. According to the court, the Rule did not limit the
"actual facts" to which the expert may testify. Id. at 1071-72; see also United States v. Edwards,
819 F.2d 262, 265 (11th Cir. 1987). The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits subsequently adopted the
Mest holding. See United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Prickett, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986).
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closely follows an applicable statute. Courts have excluded experts'
responses to questions regarding the defendant's ability to discern the
wrongfulness of his behavior or his ability to conform his behavior to
legal requirements.6 The courts invoked Rule 704(b) because the questions mirrored the language of the then applicable test of insanityr9
Other courts have prohibited the defendant's experts from stating
an opinion as to whether the defendant was "legally insane" at the
time of the offense.0 Similarly, in one case where the defendant's
intent to evade taxes constituted an element of the offense charged,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's admission of expert
6
testimony that the defendant "intentionally" understated his income. 1
2. Some Courts Exclude Testimony on Certain Issues,
Regardless of Terminology
Although some courts apply Rule 704(b) as merely a stylistic regulation of the terms employed by mental health experts, 62 other courts
indicate that the rule focuses on issues rather than terminology. In
United States v. Esch,63 the defendant was convicted of sexual exploitation of childrenr4 Defense counsel attempted to introduce a clinical
psychologist's testimony that the defendant had a "dependent personality," and that the defendant's attitudes towards sexuality stemmed
from certain childhood experiences.' In affirming the trial court's exclusion of the testimony,66 the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the testimony was offered to show the defendant's inability to form the requisite intent. 7 This intent was an element of the offense.6 Thus, the
court excluded the expert's diagnosis because it was relevant to the

58.

See Mest, 789 F.2d at 1071; United States v. Prickett, 604 F. Supp. 407, 409 (S.D.

Ohio 19&5), affid, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986).
59. Both offenses occurred prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
While Rule 704(b) is procedural and may be retroactively applied, the insanity test is substantive
and retroactive application would violate the Constitution's ex post facto clause. See supra note

57 and accompanying text.
60.
61.

United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1460 (11th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Wmdfelder, 790 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1986).

62. See aupra note 57 and accompanying text.
63.

832 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1987).

64. Id. at 533.
65.

Id. at 534.

66. Id. at 533.
67.

Id. at 535.

68.

Id.
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ultimate issue before the jury, even though the opinion omitted legal
or statutory language.69

The decision in United States v. Cox7o reveals a similar departure
from the stylistic approach in favor of an issue based analysis. The
Cox court allowed an expert to testify that the defendant, who failed
to raise the insanity defense, was aware of the wrongfulness of his
criminal act.7 ' Although the testimony reflected the language of the
insanity statute, the court admitted the testimony because the ultimate
issue was the defendant's intent, not insanity.2 If the defendant's
insanity had been the ultimate issue, then the court would have
excluded the testimony.
The Cox holding directly conflicts with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Hillsberg.7 In Hillsberg, the defendant sought
to introduce expert testimony that the defendant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 74 The testimony was
intended to prove that the defendant was unable to form the requisite
intent for second degree murder, rather than to show that he was
insane. 75 The court rejected the proffered testimony, reasoning that
the defendant's intent was an ultimate question reserved exclusively
for the jury.7 6
In both Cox and Hillsberg, the defendant attempted to introduce
expert testimony phrases in terms of insanity tests, but relevant only
to the issue of the defendant's intent. While the Hillsberg court
excluded the testimony because it embraced the ultimate issue of the
defendant's intent, the Cox court admitted the testimony for the same
reason.
The prospective exclusion of expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental state in United States v. Buchbinder also indicates an
issue based interpretation of Rule 704(b). In Buchbinder, the defendant
contended he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to introduce
expert psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's lack of requl-

69. The exclusion of diagnostic testimony specifically contradicts the express legislative
intent to allow experts to present and explain their diagnoses. See S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 36, at 3412-13.
70. 826 F.2d 1518 (6th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 1524.
72. Id.
73. 812 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1987).

74. Id. at 331.
75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 332.

77.

796 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1986).
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site mental state. 8 The court held that the defendant was not prejudiced, as the testimony would have been excluded by Rule 704(b) had
it been offered. 79 Because the testimony had not yet been articulated,
prospective exclusion of all testimony on the issue of the defendant's
mental state without knowledge of the language of the testimony cannot be characterized as "stylistic."
The issue based analysis often leads to illogical results. In United
States v. Aders,80 the Fourth Circuit allowed the defendant's expert
to testify about the defendant's mental disease and to describe the
characteristics of the disease."' The court permitted the expert to state
whether an inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct
was a characteristic of the defendant's disease 2 However, the court
did not allow the expert to opine whether the defendant was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act. The court thus defined the
defendant's specific ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions
as the ultimate issue, and refused to permit testimony on that issue.
Yet, identically phrased testimony that mandated the same conclusion
was admissible. The court permitted this testimony because it did not
specifically refer to the defendant and, in form, it avoided the ultimate
issue . 4
United States v. Dotsons suggests an interpretation of Rule 704(b)
that is neither stylistic nor issue based. In Dotson, the defendant was
convicted of tax evasion.s On appeal, the defendant assigned as error
the trial court's admission of a government tax expert's testimony
that the defendant "willfully and intentionally" failed to report income.Y Although the expert's testimony both related to the defendant's
mental state constituting an element of the crime and was phrased in
the terms of the applicable statute, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's admission of the testimony. The court reasoned that
78.

Id. at 917.

79. Id.
80.

816 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished disposition available in WESTLAW, CTA 4

database).
81. Id. Although the phrase "severe mental disease" mirrors the language of the insanity
statute, the legislative history specifically allows experts to testify on that issue. See S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 36, at 3412.
82. 816 F.2d 673.
83. Id.

84. Id. The court admitted that its approach stressed form over function, but explained
that such emphasis "is the essence of Rule 704(b)." Id.
85. 817 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1987).

86. Id.
87.

Id. at 1132.

88. Id.
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the expert's testimony merely summarized facts and that the expert
drew a conclusion based on these facts 9 Under this approach, all
expert testimony would be admissible, even if phrased in legal terms
and directly related to an ultimate-issue, if the expert first established
the underlying facts supporting the conclusion.
In light of the inconsistent applications of Rule 704(b), it is unclear
how Hinckley would have proceeded had the rule been in effect. Courts
endorsing the stylistic approach would allow Hinckley's doctors to
testify fully about the characteristics and the severity of Hinckley's
mental disease. Yet, these courts would preclude the experts' conclusions that Hinckley was insane, or unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts, or to conform them to the law.9 Courts employing
the issue based analysis would prohibit the experts from offering any
testimony, regardless of phraseology, which bears on the ultimate
issue of Hinckley's sanity. 91 The latter courts might, under Cox, allow
testimony as to sanity if offered to prove that Hinckley could not have
formed the requisite intent.Y Courts following Dotson would permit
experts to state all conclusions after providing a proper factual basis.93
Thus, the conflict between legislative intent and the language of the
rule, the incongruity between the language of Rule 704(b) and Rule
704(a)'s abolition of the ultimate issue rule, and the resultant divergent
applications of Rule 704(b), render futile any attempt to predict the
admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony.
IV.

THE FOUR DANGERS THAT RULE

704(b) ADDRESSES

The legislative history of Rule 704(b) and court opinions enforcing
the rule reveal four perceived dangers posed by expert mental health
testimony. Some courts contend that mental health experts go beyond
their expertise when asserting legal conclusions. Other courts fear
that ultimate issue testimony invades the province of the jury. Congress and courts also express concern that psychiatric testimony confuses the jury. Finally, courts have held that expert opinions regarding
sanity necessitate an impermissible moral judgment.

89. Id.
90. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
92. See United States v. Cox, 826 F.2d 1518 (6th Cir. 1987) (admitting expert opinion as
to sanity as an ultimate issue focused on intent to rob, not sanity/insanity). But cf. United
States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1987) (excluding testimony reflecting the language
of an inapplicable insanity test).
93. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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A.

Mental Health Experts State Impermissible Legal Conclusions

Federal courts excluding expert psychiatric testimony often state
that while experts may present all relevant facts, they may not state
their conclusions.94 Both the APA Statement 95 and the House Judiciary
Committee Report: expressed concern that mental health experts
draw legal conclusions despite their lack of legal expertise. One perceived danger in allowing such testimony is that the expert might
adopt, and the jury might accept, an erroneous legal standard.9
The danger of expert witnesses inaccurately stating the law is not
exclusive to the mental health area. When an expert witness expresses
an opinion regarding the "cause"- of an accident, or the "guilt" of a
party, the jury may adopt the expert's implicit definition of those legal
terms. However, the Rules of Evidence adequately deal with this
danger. The Advisory Committee Note to the original Rule 704 specifically stated that Rules 701, 702 and 403 "stand ready to exclude
opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. ' ' 1°
A mental health expert may either state or imply an erroneous
legal standard. The latter occurs when the expert incorrectly testifies
that the defendant was sane or insane because the expert relied upon
an incorrect standard when rendering his opinion. For example, a
psychiatrist who believes that the defendant understood the wrongfulness of his actions, but was unable to conform his behavior to the

94. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (courts must exclude
"conclusions of law, for which the psychiatrist has no competence"); see also United States v. Cox,
826 F.2d 1518, 1524 (6th Cir. 1987) ("the district court promptly sustained objections to [the
expert's] rendering of such a legal conclusion"); United States v. Edwards, 819 F.2d 262, 265
(11th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 704(b) forbids only 'conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue"'); United
States v. Aders, 816 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1987) (the expert "could not state the legal conclusion
that Aders himself was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts").
95. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 3412 n.33.
96. H.R. REP. No. 577, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983); see also Note, Resurrection of the
Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 620, 626 (1986-87) ("[t]he committee noted that mental health experts have no special
ability to draw legal conclusions about insanity").
97. See Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[t]he problem
with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and
perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury").
98. See Owen v. Kerr McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983).
99. See United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1978).
100. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 704(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 284 (U.S. 1972); see Torres,
758 F.2d 147 (expert could not testify that defendant "discriminated" against plaintiff); Davis
v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984) (expert could not testify that discrimination was "unlawful").
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requirements of the law, might state that the defendant was insane.
The expert would be unaware that the assumed facts do not meet the
current insanity test. 0 ' Requiring the expert to explain the basis of
the conclusion eliminates this danger. In fact, Rule 704(a) specifically
prohibits naked conclusions, as they are "inadequately explored."' 2
Thus, Rule 704(b) is unnecessary to exclude a witness' unsupported
conclusion that the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the
crime. 103
If the expert states the basis of his conclusion but improperly
recites the insanity defense, the error will not go unnoticed. Opposing
counsel will either promptly object or expose the expert's lack of
understanding of the law on cross examination. Even in the unlikely
event that the error escapes the attention of opposing counsel, the
judge will correct the error by instructing the jury of the applicable
legal standard.104
The second perceived danger in allowing experts to testify in terms
of legal conclusions is that the conclusions often include legal jargon
unintelligible to the lay juror. 05 Federal Rule 702, which allows expert
testimony only if it will assist the trier of fact,' ° r adequately addresses
this concern; incomprehensible testimony does not assist the jury. Furthermore, despite the APA's stance that mental health experts should

be permitted to testify in "clinical and commonsense terms,"''1 7 courts

have excluded understandable language merely because it reflects
statutory wording. 1°8 This protection is, however, ill founded. For
example, testimony that a defendant is "incapable of appreciating the
wrongfulness of his conduct"' 9 will not confuse the jury. 110
Courts excluding psychiatric conclusions incorrectly assume that
this testimony will mislead the jury. If an expert's opinion rests on

101. See supra note 9.
102. Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. at 284.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 417 F.2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (experts
must reveal their "underlying reasons and approach," rather than present opinions to the jury
"on a take-it-or-leave-it basis").
104. Id. at 1008 (suggested jury instruction for insanity cases).
105. See, e.g., Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (jurors are
often confused by "unintelligible technical jargon").
106. See supra note 30.
107. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 3412 n.33.
108. See supra notes 58-61, 73-76 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Prickett, 604 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1985), affd, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986).
110. See Sallet, supranote 1, at 1553 (the ALI's two pronged insanity test "does not appear
to be unusually abstruse").
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an improper basis or is phrased in terms unclear to the jury,"' the
testimony is not "otherwise admissible;" Rule 702 excludes the testimony from evidence. If, as these courts suggest, the purpose of Rule
704(b) is to exclude legal conclusions, rather than ultimate issues, Rule
704(b) is thus unnecessary, and improperly suggests that unsupported
or unintelligible conclusions by non-psychiatric experts are admissi112
ble.
B.

Expert Testimony on the Issue of a Defendant's Mental Condition
Invades the Province of the Jury

The most frequent objection to testimony excluded by Rule 704(b)
is that the impermissible opinion would "invade the province of the
jury."113 Courts excluding testimony on this basis revive the defunct
ultimate issue rule, long ago abandoned and dismissed as "empty
rhetoric. '' 14 The APA's admonition that the determination of legal
insanity is for the jury rather than the expert,11 5 the federal courts'
oft-repeated assertion that ultimate issues must be "reserved" for the
jury,16 and the plain language of Rule 704(b) 117 are all reminiscent of
the sweeping exclusions of ultimate issue testimony in the nineteenth
century."" Nevertheless, Rule 704(a) still stands for the general abolition of the ultimate issue rule. Since Rule 704(b) is an exception to
Rule 704(a), this limited application of the ultimate issue rule suggests
that testimony regarding the criminal defendant's mental condition
poses a greater risk of invading the jury's province than does all other
ultimate issue testimony.
The original ultimate issue rule rests on the premise that if a
witness states an opinion as to how the case should be decided, the
jury might ignore the facts of the case and blindly accept the expert
witness' conclusion as true. In response to the contention that tes-

111. Some non-psychiatric cases suggest that testimony must be rephrased if the jury would
ascribe a different meaning to the terms than is intended by the expert. United States v. Kelly,
679 F.2d 135, 136 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
112. See C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 128 (2d ed. 1988 Pocket Part) ("Hopefully,
the amendment will not be interpreted as a Congressional intent to permit testimony regarding
legal conclusions in all cases other than those specified in [Rule 704(b)].").
113. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Prickett, 604 F. Supp. 407, 409 (S.D. Ohio 1985), affd, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986).
114. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
115. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 3412 n.33.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986).
117. See supra note 35.
118. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

timony by lay witnesses poses the very same risk, 119 courts have argued
that scientific testimony is often beyond the ken of lay jurors. As
such, jurors choose to accept the experts' conclusions rather than wade
through "unintelligible technical jargon."' 0 However, scientific testimony includes many areas of expertise not covered by Rule 704(b).
Furthermore, the testimony that the Rule excludes is neither unintelligible nor technical. Finally, psychiatric testimony is generally less
likely to overawe the jury than other types of expert testimony.
The jury is prone to discredit expert psychiatric testimony for
several reasons. First, society shares the distrust of psychiatry expressed in the legislative history of Rule 704(b). 2 1 Defense psychiatrists
are at a particular disadvantage, due to the popular belief that they
conspire to keep sane criminals out of prison. 2 This disadvantage is
magnified by the defense's burden of proving insanity by clear and
convincing evidence, 123 especially when the jury naturally presumes
most men are sane.us Furthermore, the jury may be prejudiced against
the defense psychiatrist by natural desires to gain retribution,n or
by personal beliefs that insanity does not excuse criminal acts.
While courts have cited the "mystic infallibility"'' juries accord
scientific evidence, the legislative history of Rule 704(b) states that
the purpose of the rule is to eliminate "the confusing spectacle of
competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions .... ."m7 These concerns are incompatible. A jury clearly cannot

119. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 423 (1952) ("a jury is no more required
to accept a questionable opinion of an expert than it is required to accept a false statement of
fact").
120. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
121. Sallet, supra note 1, at 1553 (congressional debates reflected "widespread societal
distrust of psychiatry;" former Attorny General Smith referred to mental health experts as
"supposed experts"). See also Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in
the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 466 (1980)
(jurors are naturally skeptical of psychiatric testimony).
122. Sallet, supra note 1, at 1553.
123. See supra note 9.
124. Since our laws generally prohibit acts that the majority considers wrongful, one who
violates the law, but does not appreciate that the action is wrongful is, except as to a few
unpopular laws, in the minority. Thus, by definition, most people are sane.
125. When a jury acquits a defendant upon determining that the defendant did not commit
the crime, the acquittal may restore the jury's faith in the criminal justice system. When,
however, the jury determines that the defendant committed a criminal act, but will not be held
responsible for it, the jury is likely to feel that a wrong has not been redressed.
126. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
127. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 3412.
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accept both the conclusion that the defendant is sane and the conclusion
that the defendant is insane. Furthermore, the experts need not conflict for the jury to dispense with the supposed mystic infallibility of
scientific evidence. In rare cases where the defense presents uncontradicted expert testimony as to the defendant's insanity, juries have
often exercised their right to disregard the expert's conclusion. 8
Even if juries were prone to blindly accept psychiatric testimony,
Rule 704(b) would not remedy the situation. The legislative history
provides that the expert must be permitted to state a diagnosis and
explain the characteristics of the disease, even though the existence
of the disease is also an ultimate issue for the jury.'2 Because the
diagnosis necessitates medical terminology, the "unintelligible technical jargon" that mesmerizes the jury is admissible. Furthermore,
expert testimony that the defendant has a severe mental disease and
that people who suffer from the disease cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts, convinces the jury just as if the expert could
state the inevitable conclusion.13° In fact, expert testimony may be
more convincing if the expert cannot state the conclusion. If courts
allow opinion testimony that logically requires the jury to reach a
certain conclusion and then do not allow the expert to state the conclusion, then the jury might erroneously assume that it reached the
conclusion itself. Jurors are likely to be more overawed by their own
conclusions than by conclusions of even the most impressive witnesses.
The ultimate issue rule is unworkable. No clear line exists between
testimony that embraces an ultimate issue and testimony that merely
assists the jury in issue resolution. More significantly, the rule was
abandoned as theoretically unsound. Witnesses are incapable of usurping the jury's function as finder of fact. 31 The jury can, and will,
128. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 583 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dresser, 542 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1976); Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1961); McClain v. State, 327 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
129. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 36, at 3412.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Aders, No. 86-5127,816 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished
disposition available in WESTLAW, CTA 4 database) (the court would have allowed an expert
to testify that defendant had a certain mental disease, and that people suffering from the disease
were unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions, but not that defendant was similarly
unable); United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1987) (the court indicated that
an expert could give testimony that logically required a particular finding by the jury, but could
not state the logically required inference); United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.
1978) (an expert could testify that defendant was a bookmaker, but not that defendant was
"guilty" of bookmaking).
131. Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 344-47, 5 N.W.2d 646, 656 (1942)
("a witness could not usurp [the] function or invade the province of the jury, by his opinion, if
he wished"); see also Ladd, supra note 119, at 424 ('Jurors realized that they are the final triers
to determine the issues and are reluctant to part with that right").
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disregard testimony that it deems unreliable or untrue, regardless of
its presentation. 132 Opposing counsel, through cross-examination, 1 and
the presiding judge, through jury instruction, 13 can ensure that unreliable or inaccurate testimony does not reach the jury. Beyond those
measures, our judicial system has no choice but to trust the jury's
ability to recognize the truth."1
C. ConflictingExpert Mental Health Testimony Confuses the Jury
Congress 136 and the courts 137 have expressed concern that expert
mental health testimony confuses the jury. However, Rule 403 allows
the judge to exclude relevant testimony if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 13 If Rule 704(b) is designed to prevent confusing psychiatric testimony, Congress must have
determined, per se, that the confusion wrought by the testimony substantially outweighs the value of the testimony. Alternatively, Congress has imposed a harsher standard for admitting the testimony.
The phraseology excluded by 704(b) is not inherently confusing;
conclusions as to a defendant's sanity are only confusing when they
are contradictory. Yet, the nature of the adversary system invites
conflicting evidence as an integral part of the fact-finding process. 139

132. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 501 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1974) ("the testimony
of an expert witness may be disregarded if it conflicts with the sound judgment of the [trier
of fact]"); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 242 (8th Cir. 1962) ("[0If course it is the
jury, and not the ... expert... which must decide the ultimate issue of insanity here. And
the jury was free to reject the testimony of ... these experts."). But cf. Douglass v. United
States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (the jury may not arbitrarily disregard expert testimony).
133. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1984) (expert's lack
of familiarity with the applicable stature was exposed on cross-examination); see also Bonnie
& Slobogin, supra note 121, at 466 ("the imprecision of an expert's concepts, and the possible
shortcomings of his evaluative techniques, may be explored through direct examination and
cross examination").
134. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (jury instructions
can prevent encroachment upon the jury's function); see also United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d
551, 557 (5th Cir. 1981) (expert opinion was placed in proper perspective by jury instructions).
135. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1984) ("our theory of trial relies upon
the ability of the jury to follow instructions"); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 98
(E.D. Mich. 1972) (juries are skilled in discerning the truth).
136. S. Rep., supra note 36, at 3405 (Department of Justice Statement).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing the
confusing battle of experts).
138. See supra note 31.
139. Slovenko, The Insanity Defense in the Wake of the Hinckley Trial, 14 RUTGERs L.J.
373, 380-81 (1983) (conflicts of testimony often lead to discovery of truth).
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Accordingly, testimony should be excluded only if inherently confusing,
independent of other evidence.
Furthermore, Rule 704(b) admits the most confusing testimony,
the expert's medical diagnosis, 140 and excludes the least confusing testimony, the expert's opinion as to sanity. Furthermore, stopping the
expert short of a conclusion precludes the expert from explaining the
link between the diagnosis and the determination of insanity. 14 By
denying the expert the opportunity to summarize the testimony, the
Rule diminishes the clarity of the admitted testimony.
Rule 704(b) thus excludes testimony that does not confuse the jury,
and that has significant probative value in summarizing the expert's
testimony. A per se exclusion of such testimony invades the judge's
province to determine the admissibility of evidence.'"
D.

Conclusions as to Sanity Involve an Impermissible
Moral Judgment

The most perplexing justification for excluding expert testimony
on the ultimate issue of mental condition is that expert testimony
implies an impermissible moral judgment.' Determining which mental
states excuse criminal conduct necessitates a moral decision. Yet, such
moral judgments are made by the legislature, not the judge, jury, or
witness. Eliminating the volitional prong of the insanity defense test"
was a moral decision; Congress decided that one who is unable to
resist committing criminal acts, but who knows that such acts are
wrong, is nonetheless responsible for those acts. Given the test of
insanity established by Congress, the jury must simply apply the facts

140. See generally Sallet, supra note 1 (medical testimony from the Hinckley trial).
141. Ciccone & Clements, The Insanity Defense: Asking and Answering the Ultimate Question, Vol. 15, No. 4 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 335 (1987):

To bar the psychiatrist from providing an opinion about the relationship of the
psychiatric illness to the person's capacity to make a choice and appreciate its
consequences is to artifically separate the process of inquiry . . . . To deny the
jury the expert's opinion is to deny the jury the opportunity to directly hear the

full scientific inquiry and assess its validity.
Id. See also Note, supra note 96, at 633 (conclusions "may be essential to ensure that the

factfinder gets the 'thrust' of complicated explanations").
142.

FED. R. EVID. 104(a) provides that questions of admissibility of expert testimony

shall be determined by the court.
143. See S. REP. No. 225, at 3412, n.33, supra note 36; Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note
121, at 456 (whether defendant should be held responsible is a social and moral question); see,
e.g., United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966) (expert testimony involving

a moral or legal pronouncement is inadmissible).
144.

See supra notes 9 & 36.
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as it finds them. If the jury finds that the defendant appreciated the
wrongfulness of his conduct, it may not find him not guilty by reason
of insanity, regardless of any moral convictions. The expert witness
merely aids the jury in this ultimate factual determination by presenting data and opinions as to the defendant's mental state at the time
of the offense.
The moral judgment objection seems to imply that absent Rule
704(b), courts would permit experts to testify that a defendant "should
not be held responsible" for his actions. An opinion of this sort does
not assist the jury, and is thus inadmissible under Rule 702.145 An
expert's opinion that a defendant was "unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts," or even that a defendant was "insane" (if the
expert reveals the basis for the opinion) assists the jury, and does
146
not involve a moral judgment.
V.

PROPOSAL

Although the dangers Rule 704(b) contemplates are overstated,
the Rule addresses several legitimate concerns. However, the Rule
as written and applied does not adequately remedy these problems,
and inaccurately suggests that such dangers are exclusive to psychiatric testimony. Proper implementation of Rule 702 would eliminate
legitimate dangers that opinion testimony poses, and would eliminate
the usefulness of Rule 704(b).
First, in order to further the intent of Rule 704(a), unsupported
conclusions should be excluded. An expert's opinion is helpful and
reliable only if supported by adequate factual conclusions. Under Rule
702, courts should therefore require each expert to explain the underlying premise of the expert's opinion.
Second, courts should exclude testimony couched in terms that
the ordinary juror will not understand. However, terms should not
be deemed incomprehensible merely because they track statutory terminology. Instead, courts should require experts to explain any term
that is beyond the jury's understanding. If the expert fails to
adequately explain the testimony, the court should exclude it under
Rule 702 as unhelpful to the jury.
Third, courts should not allow witnesses to determine legal standards. Accordingly, courts should exclude testimony that states or
implies to the jury the applicable legal standard. Such testimony is
clearly unhelpful to the jury, and thus, inadmissable under Rule 702.
145. See supra note 30.
146. See Ciccone & Clements, supra note 141, at 336 ("to characterize conclusions as moral
and legal is to misunderstand the scientific process, which is synthetic").
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Finally, courts must not restrict testimony merely because it bears
on an ultimate issue. All relevant expert testimony should be admitted
if it will assist the trier of fact. Jurors must be trusted to separate
convincing from unconvincing expert testimony. Given these modifications, Rule 704(b) as it exists should be repealed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If Rule 704(b) is merely a congressional determination that opinion
testimony formulated as a legal conclusion is not helpful to the trier
of fact, then the rule is an egregious example of poorly worded and
improperly codified legislation. The implementation of Rule 702
suggested herein 147 would better effectuate congressional intent and
eliminate linkage to the long abandoned ultimate issue rule. Use of
Rule 702 would encompass all expert testimony and would not imply,
as does Rule 704(b), that a non-psychiatric expert may define legal
standards, assert naked conclusions, or testify in terms a jury might

misunderstand.148
If, however, Rule 704(b) reflects Congress' belief that testimony
that might assist the trier of fact should nevertheless be excluded
149
because it bears on the ultimate issue of the defendant's mental state,
the rule is far more offensive. Such a rule expresses an unfounded
distrust of psychiatry5 ° and unfairly prejudices the criminal defendant.
Superior governmental resources place criminal defendants at a disadvantage from the outset; 151 when the defendant must bear the burden
of proving insanity, the court must permit the defendant to produce
all relevant evidence. 52 Yet, Rule 704(b) mandates the exclusion of
relevant, probative testimony for fear that it may be too persuasive.
Exclusion on these grounds contradicts the underlying premise of our
criminal justice system: it is better to acquit several guilty persons
than to punish one innocent person.

147 See supra section V.
148. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
149. The plain language of the rule suggests this intent. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
150. Psychiatry has evolved from its originally unreliable state, and merits trust today.
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court recently

recognized the necessity for psychiatric assistance when it held that an indigent criminal defendant has a constitutional right to psychiatric assistance if sanity is at issue. Ake v. Oklahoma,
467 U.S. 68 (1985).
151. The government's greater resources and credibility are offset by the general presump-

tion of innocence.
152. See Freeman, 357 F.2d at 624 ("[i]n a criminal trial, when life and liberty hang in the
balance ... arbitrary limitations on expert and jury are all the less defensible'.
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When the jury found John Hinckley, Jr. not guilty of a crime
millions watched him voluntarily commit, many citizens became outraged that this guilty man would escape punishment. 16 But in the
eyes of the law, Hinckley, or anyone who commits a wrongful act,
but due to mental disease is unaware of the wrongfulness of the act,
is innocent.'5 " Imprisoning such a person punishes the innocent and
denies treatment to the sick.lm Those who believe that all persons are
responsible for voluntarily acting in a manner that society regards
as wrongful, regardless of the actor's inability to comprehend societal
norms, may argue that the current test of insanity is inappropriate.
They may even contend that the insanity defense should be
abolished. 15 They may not, however, justifiably assert that a criminal
defendant should be deprived of the opportunity to produce evidence
relevant to the current test. Until the law changes, all evidence that
assists the jury in applying the current test must be admitted.
David Cohen

153. Salet, supra note 1, at 1553 (many Americans believe "that a sane man was kept
from jail with the assistance of doctors skilled in an inexact discipline").
154. See supra note 9.
155. Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("[it is both wrong and
foolish to punish where there is no blame and where punishment cannot correct").
156 According to an ABC news survey taken soon after the Hinckley case, only 21% of
those polled supported the existence of an insanity defense. Ciccone & Clements, supra note
143, at 329. The APA, however, has asserted that the defense is "'essential to the moral integrity
of the law."' Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss3/2

22

